Privileged access management (PAM) is the set of controls that decides who can use administrator-level access, when, for what reason and with what record of what they did. For most UK small organisations the useful answer is not "buy a PAM product". It is to get the basics right first: fewer admins, separate accounts, multi-factor authentication, time-limited elevation and logging. Then have an expert try to abuse those accounts, so you know the controls hold. That is the work we do at Solusec.
Key Takeaways
- PAM puts a controlled, logged gate in front of administration. The NCSC builds it on two ideas: just-in-time and just-enough administration.
- PAM is a specialised part of identity and access management (IAM), not a replacement for it. Privileged account management is the narrower job inside PAM.
- You can meet the core PAM controls without a dedicated tool, though a tool makes them easier to sustain as you grow.
- Shared, service and emergency accounts are where most small organisations are weakest. Each needs an owner, MFA or strong protection, and alerting.
- Testing proves the controls work. A penetration test shows whether an attacker can still climb from an ordinary account to an administrator one.
Table of Contents
- What privileged access management means
- How PAM works
- PAM, privileged account management and IAM: the differences
- PAM best practices for UK organisations
- Securing shared, service and emergency accounts
- Do you need a dedicated PAM tool?
- Proving the controls work
- Where Solusec fits
- A 30-day starting plan
- FAQ
- Sources
What privileged access management means
The NCSC describes PAM as an additional security measure that sits in front of your system administration interfaces. Instead of an administrator holding powerful rights all day, they request access, the request is checked, and access is granted for the task and then removed.
Microsoft's UK guidance frames it as an identity security approach that monitors, detects and prevents unauthorised privileged access to critical resources, while showing who is using privileged accounts and what they do.
The point is simple. Credential theft is the most common way attackers get in, and an ordinary stolen password is a nuisance. A stolen administrator password hands over the whole environment. IBM sets out how PAM reduces that impact: it limits the number of privileged users, protects their credentials, enforces least privilege and narrows the period in which elevated access can be used.
What counts as a privileged account
Privilege is wider than "the IT manager's login". The DWP's standard SS-001 Part 2 defines a privileged user as someone authorised to perform security-relevant functions that standard users cannot, such as managing security configurations, altering system operations or administering other accounts. The definition applies whether the privileges are permanent or temporary.
In practice that covers:
- domain administrator and local administrator accounts
- cloud tenant and application administrators
- service accounts that run software in the background
- emergency (break-glass) accounts
- business users with elevated rights, such as a finance lead who can change payment settings
IBM also points out that non-human identities such as machines, applications and workloads can hold elevated privileges, for example an automated backup process with access to confidential files and system settings. Those accounts rarely get reviewed, which is why they matter.
How PAM works
The NCSC builds PAM on two concepts, and both are easy to apply in a small organisation.
Just-in-time administration. The NCSC explains that access is granted only when it is needed, for a valid reason, and then expires. Nobody holds standing administrator rights "just in case".
Just-enough administration. An administrator receives only the permissions the task requires, rather than a permanent master key. Resetting a password does not need rights to delete a database.
Around those two ideas sit the common controls: automated password management, multi-factor authentication, continuous session monitoring and reports of privileged activity, as Microsoft lists them. The NCSC adds a useful side effect: PAM gives you an additional audit source. Requests can be tied to support tickets, and the actions taken are recorded in logs.
A worked example
Imagine a 40-person firm with one IT manager and an outsourced support provider. Today, three people share a domain administrator password kept in a spreadsheet. Under a PAM approach:
- Each person gets a named administrator account, separate from their daily account.
- The shared password is retired. Elevation is requested for a task, with a ticket reference.
- MFA protects every administrator sign-in.
- Access expires when the task ends.
- The log shows who did what, so a suspicious change can be traced to a person.
Nothing there requires an enterprise budget. It requires deciding who needs what, and writing it down.
PAM, privileged account management and IAM: the differences
These terms get mixed up, partly because the abbreviation is the same.
Privileged account management is the narrower job. IBM describes it as creating, provisioning, securing and disposing of accounts with elevated permissions, and as one of three pillars of PAM alongside privilege management and privileged-session management. PAM proper adds the decisions about when privilege is granted and the controls over the session itself: approval, time-limited elevation, monitoring and recording.
The IDPro Body of Knowledge draws the same line. It describes PAM as a mechanism for managing temporary access for accounts with high-risk permissions, often with a credential checked out for single use, while privileged account management is about getting those special accounts under control.
PAM versus IAM. IAM governs identities and access for everyone in the organisation. PAM is the specialised part for the highest-risk access. The NCSP's PAM standard states plainly that PAM is an integral part of identity and access management, with a specific focus on protecting, monitoring, detecting and preventing unauthorised privileged access. In short, IAM answers "who is this and what may they normally do?", and PAM answers "who may do the dangerous things, and how do we control that?"
| Privileged account management | PAM | IAM | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Lifecycle of elevated accounts and credentials | Account management plus privilege decisions and session controls | All identities and access |
| Typical controls | Creation, vaulting, rotation, disposal | Approval, time-limited elevation, recording, audit | Single sign-on, joiner-mover-leaver, standard MFA |
| Question answered | Do we know and protect our admin accounts? | Who may use them, when and how? | Who is this and what can they reach? |
If you are choosing an identity platform at the same time, our comparison of Okta and Microsoft Entra ID for a UK SME covers the identity layer that PAM sits on top of.
PAM best practices for UK organisations
The most reliable guidance comes from the NCSC and from public-sector standards that UK suppliers are increasingly measured against. Boiled down:
1. Cut the number of administrators
The NCSC recommends minimising administrative users, applying least privilege or role-based access, using privileged access only when necessary, and logging and monitoring privileged activity. Start by listing every account with admin rights, and remove those with no current need.
2. Separate admin and everyday accounts
The NCSC's 10 Steps guidance recommends separate administrator and everyday accounts, and advises against using administrative accounts for email or internet browsing. Phishing an administrator who is reading email is far easier than attacking a hardened admin sign-in.
3. Put MFA on every administrator
The same guidance recommends MFA for administrative accounts, with strong methods such as hardware security tokens, and risk signals such as location or time considered where appropriate. Which authenticator suits a small team is covered in our Duo versus Microsoft Authenticator comparison.
4. Make privilege time-limited and justified
The DWP's policy requires privileged access to be provided only for business needs, be timebound and granted through a documented approvals process. Permanent privileged access is to be avoided where possible, and access is removed when the task ends. You do not have to be a government supplier to copy that rule.
5. Log requests and watch the logs
The NCSC's advice for a PAM system covers justified requests with appropriate approvals, strong protected credentials with limited validity, logging of requests and monitoring of activity. It also says to patch and configure the PAM system itself, because it becomes a high-value target. Logs only help if someone reads them, which is where SOC consulting and support comes in for organisations without a security team.
6. Use dedicated devices for high-risk work
The NCSC's guidance on privileged access workstations says they can be used for all privileged access but matter most for high-risk access where the impact of compromise is serious. For a small business that might mean one hardened laptop used only for domain and cloud administration.
7. Hold your suppliers to the same standard
If an MSP administers your systems, the NCSC advises that their privileges should be proportionate to the contracted task, not normally permanent root or global administrator access, and attributable to specific people rather than generic shared management accounts. Our view on why your MSP is not the best judge of your cyber security explains why an independent check matters here.
Securing shared, service and emergency accounts
These three account types cause most of the trouble in small environments.
Shared accounts. A shared administrator login means no log can say who acted. Replace it with named accounts. Where a shared credential is unavoidable, keep it in a protected vault, issue it per task and change it after use.
Service accounts. Give each service its own account, with only the rights that service needs, and a named human owner. Review the list when systems are retired, because forgotten service accounts with broad rights are an easy target.
Emergency accounts. You need a way back in if your PAM system or identity provider fails. The NCSC says to consider availability, high availability and a carefully protected emergency process so administrators can recover access if PAM becomes unavailable. For cloud emergency accounts, it recommends immediate robust alarms whenever one is used, both to limit damage and to discourage routine use. Treat any use of the account as an event to investigate.
The same logic applies beyond IT. Physical access control in high-criticality environments rests on named people, recorded use and limited rights, just as digital privilege does.

Do you need a dedicated PAM tool?
Not necessarily, and not on day one. The NCSP standard notes that its controls could be easiest and most effectively met by a dedicated PAM solution but can also be achieved without one, and expects organisations to mature towards a dedicated tool over time. That is a sensible path for a growing business: establish the practices, then add tooling when volume makes manual control hard.
The NCSC's small-company example in its tiering model is a good template. It uses a Tier 2 account to edit web-server content and a Tier 0 account for delegation and emergencies such as disaster recovery. Two clearly separated levels, with the powerful one rarely used, already removes most day-to-day exposure.
A tool is worth considering when:
- you have many administrators, suppliers or systems
- you cannot reliably rotate and track credentials by hand
- a customer, regulator or framework asks for session records
- you run a mix of on-premises and cloud estates
Proving the controls work
PAM is a set of decisions, and decisions can be wrong. A policy that says "no standing admin rights" means little if a forgotten account still has them, or if an ordinary user can escalate to administrator through a misconfiguration.
That is what testing is for. Our Active Directory security assessment playbook walks through the standards and fixes for the most common place privilege lives in a Windows estate. For cloud, our cloud security assessment for AWS and Azure looks at the same question in tenant and subscription administration. And what we find in practice on local networks is written up in What We Find on West Midlands Networks.
A vulnerability scan and a penetration test answer different questions. We explain the gap in penetration test versus vulnerability scan: the scan lists weaknesses, while a tester shows how they chain together into administrator access.
Where Solusec fits
Solusec is a CREST-accredited penetration testing and certification body. You deal directly with the testers and assessors who do the work, not a sales team, and findings come in plain English with proportionate recommendations.
For a business tightening its admin accounts, the sensible sequence is usually this. Get the basic controls in place, then test them. Our external IP test is priced at £3,000 and our CMS website test at £2,500, both one-off. If you want a recognised baseline first, Cyber Essentials certification costs from £320 to £600, with a gap analysis at £300 and an urgent turnaround option at £100.

If you are unsure where to begin, talk to our team about what to test first. For organisations that want logs and alerts watched, we also offer incident response and SOC consulting.
A 30-day starting plan
- Week 1: inventory. List every administrator, service and emergency account, with an owner for each.
- Week 2: cut and separate. Remove unneeded rights. Create separate everyday and admin accounts for each administrator.
- Week 3: protect. Enforce MFA on all administrator sign-ins. Retire shared passwords. Set up alerts on emergency account use.
- Week 4: verify. Review the logs, then commission an independent test of the result.
Repeat the review at least when staff, suppliers or systems change.
FAQ
What is a privileged access management system?
It is a control point in front of administration. Users request elevated access, the request is checked, access is granted for a limited time and activity is logged. It can be a dedicated product or a set of disciplined practices.
What is the difference between PAM and IAM?
IAM manages all identities and their normal access. PAM is the part of IAM focused on high-risk privileged access, adding approval, time limits and monitoring. The two work together.
Is privileged account management the same as PAM?
No. Privileged account management covers creating, securing and disposing of elevated accounts. PAM is broader and also governs when privilege is granted and what happens during a privileged session.
How do I secure admin accounts in a small business?
Give each administrator a named admin account separate from their email and browsing account, require MFA, remove rights nobody needs, and log and review administrator activity. Protect your emergency account and alert on any use.
Sources
- NCSC: Use privileged access management
- NCSC: Protecting system administration with PAM
- NCSC: 10 Steps to Cyber Security, identity and access management
- NCSC: Using SaaS securely
- NCSC: Principles for secure privileged access workstations
- NCSC: Using MSPs to administer your cloud services
- NCSC: Protecting how you administer cloud services
- NCSC: Risk manage administration using tiers
- DWP SS-001 Part 2: Privileged User Access
- GOV.UK: DWP Privileged Users Security policy
- NCSP Privileged Access Management standard v1.0
- IDPro Body of Knowledge: Introduction to Privileged Access Management
- Microsoft Security: What is privileged access management
- IBM: What is privileged access management
- Access control in high-criticality contexts
Recommended
- Active Directory Security Assessment Playbook for Admins: Standards to Fixes
- LLM Access Control Testing
- Vulnerability Management Services
- External Attack Surface Monitoring
This article was created with assistance of AI. We never use AI with your data unless given explicit permission.
