A ransomware-ready backup strategy keeps several copies of your data, makes at least one of them impossible to delete or overwrite (immutable) or disconnected from your network (offline), and proves every month that you can restore from it. Attackers know backups decide whether you pay, so they go after them first. This guide shows a small UK organisation how to build that strategy, step by step, using NCSC, DfE and IASME guidance.
Key Takeaways
- Ordinary backups are a target. The NCSC warns that attackers often delete or destroy backups early in an attack so you are more likely to pay.
- Aim for isolation, immutability and tested recovery: one copy attackers cannot reach with stolen credentials, one that cannot be changed for a set period, and a restore you have actually practised.
- Follow 3-2-1 as a floor: three copies, two forms of storage, one off-site, then add an immutable or offline layer on top.
- Test restores at least monthly. A green "backup successful" report is not proof you can recover.
- Decide recovery time and retention first, then pick the technology.
Table of Contents
- Why ordinary backups fail in a ransomware attack
- The three principles that make a backup ransomware-resistant
- Immutable backups: how they work and what to look for
- Offline and air-gapped backups
- Building a strategy that fits a small organisation
- Testing: the step most organisations skip
- What a good setup looks like for different organisations
- Backups are one layer, not the whole defence
- How Solusec can help
- FAQ
- Sources
Why ordinary backups fail in a ransomware attack
Most people picture ransomware as encryption of live files, with a backup as the safety net. Modern attacks are staged. Before encrypting anything, attackers look for your recovery options and remove them.
The NCSC says that in the early stages of a destructive attack, actors often target backups and infrastructure, deleting or destroying the data stored there to make recovery harder. BleepingComputer, reporting Acronis research from May 2026, describes the usual methods: deleting Volume Shadow Copies, abusing API access to cloud backup storage, and using legitimate admin tools so the activity looks normal.
The same report lists the failures that recur in incidents:
- no separation between production systems and backups
- weak access control, including shared admin credentials and no multi-factor authentication (MFA)
- backups that can be modified or deleted
- recovery that has never been tested
- backup and security tools that do not talk to each other
None of this means backups are the wrong answer. It means a backup that sits on the same network, behind the same admin password, is only half a strategy. The rest of this article closes those gaps.
Cloud sync is not a backup
Many small organisations rely on a file-sync service and call it a backup. The Association of British Insurers' guidance on cyber resilience (From prevention to resilience, August 2026) points out that cloud sync typically lacks long version histories, is not immutable and is not offline. If an attacker gets into the cloud account, they can delete, encrypt or corrupt files and the changes synchronise everywhere. The same guidance notes that cloud backups can be reliable when they are isolated, access-controlled, immutable or offline, and regularly tested.
The practical rule: sync is for convenience and collaboration, backup is for recovery. You want both, and you should not confuse them.

The three principles that make a backup ransomware-resistant
A useful way to judge any setup is to ask three questions.
- Isolation: if an attacker takes over an administrator account on your network, can they reach the backups?
- Immutability: can anyone, including an administrator, delete or overwrite a backup before its retention period ends?
- Verifiability: do you know, from a restore you have done, that the data comes back and the systems start?
The NCSC adds an important caution: data backed up on premises or to the cloud is not resistant to ransomware by default. It recommends considering a breadth of technologies, cloud-based, on-premises and self-managed, rather than betting everything on one. Spreading across approaches means a single failure or compromise does not take every copy with it.
Immutable backups: how they work and what to look for
An immutable backup cannot be altered or deleted for a defined period, even by someone with administrator rights. That guarantees a clean recovery point exists when you need it.
The NCSC explains that WORM (write once, read many) storage can block requests to delete or change a backup, so an attacker cannot remove the data stored on it. It also recommends offering "soft delete" by default: data is flagged as inaccessible but stays recoverable for a retention period, and neither users nor administrators should be able to delete or overwrite the area where soft-deleted data is held.
When you assess a product or service, the Acronis-based BleepingComputer summary gives a handy checklist of what immutability should involve:
- WORM storage
- time-based retention locks
- protection against API and credential misuse
- enforcement at the storage layer, not just in the backup software's settings
That last point matters. If "immutable" is just a setting an admin can switch off, it will not survive an attacker who has become an admin.
A note on retention
The NCSC advises storing backups for a retention period that matches your risk appetite rather than keeping a fixed number of copies. A fixed count lets an attacker run the job repeatedly until every good copy has been overwritten with corrupted data. A time-based retention does not.
Offline and air-gapped backups
An offline backup is one that stays unaffected if your live environment is hit. The NCSC's guidance on offline backups says to connect the backup to live systems only when absolutely necessary, and never to have all your backups connected at the same time.
IASME, which runs the Cyber Essentials scheme, gives the same advice in plain terms: devices holding backup data, such as external hard drives and USB sticks, should not be permanently connected to the network, because attackers often target backups they find connected. It adds that criminals know an organisation with a working backup is less likely to pay.
Can cloud storage be offline?
Yes, with care. The NCSC explains that cloud storage guarantees physical separation from your live environment, but when the backup is not in use it also needs to be digitally disconnected. Everyone who can access the cloud backups should be protected in line with NCSC guidance, which in practice means MFA and no shared admin accounts.
Immutable or offline: which should you choose?
| Immutable | Offline / air-gapped | |
|---|---|---|
| Protects against | Deletion or alteration, including by compromised admins | Anything that reaches your live network |
| How it works | WORM or retention lock at the storage layer | Physically or digitally disconnected when not in use |
| Day-to-day effort | Low once configured | Higher if media is swapped by hand |
| Typical form | Cloud object storage with locks, or a locked on-premises repository | Rotated disks, tape, or a disconnected cloud copy |
For most small organisations the strongest position is one of each, or at least one that meets both tests. The NCSC's advice to use a breadth of technologies supports that approach.
Building a strategy that fits a small organisation
Start with the 3-2-1 rule
The Department for Education's Cyber Security Hub sets out the 3-2-1 backup strategy for schools: three copies of data (one primary and two backups), held on two different forms of storage across at least two separate devices, with one copy off-site. It also says schools must confirm their backups are recoverable in the event of an attack. The rule is just as useful for a charity, a start-up or a ten-person office.

Then upgrade it for ransomware: make sure at least one of the backup copies is immutable or offline, and that nobody's everyday admin login can reach it.
Decide what you need to recover, and how fast
Before buying anything, write down for each system:
- Recovery point: how much data loss is tolerable? An hour of orders, a day of documents?
- Recovery time: how long can this system be down before it hurts?
- Retention: how far back might you need to go? Ransomware is sometimes present for days before it triggers, so a copy from last night may already be tainted.
The NCSC's small business guidance recommends making a regular daily or weekly backup of essential information, testing it works, and training the relevant people so they can restore it. Daily suits anything that changes constantly. Weekly can do for static archives.
For a sense of what formal organisations expect, the Department for Work and Pensions' Security Standard SS-035, published on 30 August 2023, requires backups and recovery processes to be tested at least every 15 months, and retention periods to be reviewed every 18 months. That is a government department's floor, not a target for a small business handling live customer data. Monthly testing is a better habit, as below.
Choosing a cloud provider
If part of your plan is cloud storage, the DfE hub advises checking that version history is available, that deleted files can be recovered for a set period after removal, and that you run regular restore tests. If you are weighing specific backup products, our comparison Veeam vs Acronis for a UK SME sets out how they differ.
Lock down who can touch the backups
Backups are only as safe as the accounts that control them. Practical steps:
- Use separate credentials for backup administration, never the day-to-day domain admin account.
- Turn on MFA for every backup console and cloud storage account.
- Remove standing access: give people access only when they need it.
- Keep backup management tools off the same network segment as general user devices where you can.
- Alert on backup deletions, retention changes and failed jobs.
These address the failure patterns of shared admin credentials, missing MFA and siloed tools that the BleepingComputer report highlights.
Testing: the step most organisations skip
A backup you have never restored is an assumption. IASME's guidance says backups should be tested at least monthly to be certain they can restore systems or information, and names one of the biggest causes of recovery failure: trusting a successful backup report without ever practising the recovery.
The NCSC makes the wider point that a solution which meets its principles is only effective if owners regularly test and monitor the health of the backup data and assess it as part of the whole backup system.
A simple monthly restore routine
- Pick one system or data set at random each month, rotating through your critical ones.
- Restore it to an isolated location, not over live data.
- Check the files open, the database starts and the application works.
- Time it and compare against your recovery time target.
- Note anything that was missing or slow, and fix it before the next test.
Twice a year, go further: rehearse a full scenario. Assume your main network is unusable. Who decides what to restore first? Where do staff work? Who has the offline credentials? Write the order of restoration down and keep a printed copy somewhere you can reach without your own systems.
What a good setup looks like for different organisations
| Organisation | Sensible starting point |
|---|---|
| Start-up, mostly SaaS | Dedicated backup of SaaS data (email, files, code repositories) held separately from the main account, with immutable retention and MFA |
| Small office with a server | Local backup plus an immutable cloud copy, one rotated offline disk, monthly restore test |
| School or college | DfE 3-2-1 model with one off-site immutable or offline copy, confirmed recoverable |
| Charity with volunteers and shared devices | Central cloud backup with strict admin separation and tested restore of donor and case records |
These are starting points, not a prescription. Your recovery targets should drive the final design.
Backups are one layer, not the whole defence
Backups let you recover. They do not stop an attacker stealing data before they encrypt it, and they do not close the way in. Pair them with prevention and detection:
- Reduce what attackers can reach from the internet with external attack surface monitoring.
- Understand how attackers actually get in, for example through email compromise: see our guide to common types of attack after a breach.
- Choose endpoint protection to catch the tooling attackers use: SentinelOne vs CrowdStrike for a UK SME compares two common options.
- See what we find on West Midlands networks to get a sense of typical weaknesses.
The IASME guidance also treats backups as part of the wider Cyber Essentials picture, which is one reason many organisations tackle both together.
How Solusec can help
We are a CREST-accredited cyber security company and a Certification Body for Cyber Essentials, and you deal directly with the testers and assessors who do the work, not a sales team. A backup plan is only credible if someone has tried to break around it, and that is where we come in.

Our penetration testing lists an external IP test at £3,000 and a CMS website test at £2,500, both one-off, and shows the weaknesses an attacker would use to reach your systems and, potentially, your backups. If you want to certify your basics, Cyber Essentials certification is priced at £320 to £600 one-off, a gap analysis is £300, and urgent turnaround is an extra £100. If an attack has already happened, see our incident response service, or talk to us about SOC consulting and support to improve detection.
FAQ
What is the best backup strategy against ransomware?
Keep at least three copies of your data on two forms of storage with one off-site, and make at least one copy immutable or offline so attackers cannot delete it. Protect backup accounts with MFA and separate admin credentials. Test restores monthly so you know recovery works.
Are immutable backups enough on their own?
They protect the copy from deletion or alteration, but you still need a tested restore process, controlled access and a sensible retention period. The NCSC also recommends using a breadth of backup technologies rather than one approach alone.
How often should I back up and test?
The NCSC small business guidance suggests a daily or weekly backup of essential information, depending on how fast it changes. IASME recommends testing restores at least monthly.
Does an offline backup have to be a physical disk?
No. Cloud storage can serve as an offline backup if it is physically separate from your environment and digitally disconnected when not in use, according to the NCSC. Everyone who can access it should be protected with strong authentication.
Is OneDrive or Google Drive sync a ransomware backup?
Not on its own. Sync usually lacks long version history and is not immutable or offline, so an attacker with account access can corrupt files and the changes spread, as the ABI guidance explains. Use a separate backup with retention and isolation.
Sources
- NCSC: Ransomware-resistant backups
- NCSC: Principles for ransomware-resistant on-premises backups
- NCSC: Offline backups in an online world
- NCSC: Small Business Guide, Response and Recovery
- DfE Cyber Security Hub: The 3-2-1 backup strategy
- IASME: The Cyber Essentials guide to backing up your data
- BleepingComputer: Why ransomware attacks succeed even when backups exist
- ABI: From prevention to resilience
- DWP Security Standard SS-035: Backup and Recovery
Recommended
- Veeam vs Acronis: Which Backup Suits a UK SME?
- Phishing Incident Response: A Practical UK Guide
- EDR vs Antivirus: Which Does Your UK Business Need?
- SentinelOne vs CrowdStrike: Which EDR Suits a UK SME?
This article was created with assistance of AI. We never use AI with your data unless given explicit permission.
